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nection of ideas which gave to the practical philosophy of Helvetius not only a peculiar consistency, but also a special significance for modern developments. As Prof. Mondolfo justly observes, the originality of Helvetius does not consist in this or that element of his theory, but in the whole that he made out of the different elements; while he shows that the prominence which Helvetius gave to the element of liberty was largely due to the circumstances of his time. "The truly original side of his doctrines is not in their principle, but in its application and consequences: in his conception of society and the relations of law and morality with liberty." Helvetius—and this was his most original service—put political liberty upon a basis not of natural right but of utility: and in making liberty the last word of his practical philosophy he was the "true precursor of the Liberty of Stuart Mill." On the other hand, the difference between Helvetius' treatment of the idea of liberty and the Essay on Liberty is no less significant. On this point Prof. Mondolfo is particularly instructive and suggestive. He shows how Helvetius came to combine at one and the same time the principle of liberty and of the vastest action of the State: how his doctrine contained germs of certain types of socialism, such as that of Owen and Fourier; and how it approached Rousseau's conception of the "general will." Certainly, a very interesting as well as a most suggestive appreciation.

The same author's lecture on "methodical doubt" and the history of philosophy is a vindication of the historical method in philosophy, of which his monograph on Helvetius is itself an admirable example. It is fortified by a detailed review of philosophic opinion on the conception and value of the history of philosophy, and of its place and significance in philosophical discipline; but the discussion, though of considerable interest and importance in itself, is of no direct concern to the readers of this Journal.

SIDNEY BALL.

St. John's College, Oxford.

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH PHILANTHROPY. By B. Kirkman Gray. London: P. S. King & Son. Pp. 302.

Few more inspiring subjects could be chosen for study than the History of Philanthropy. It would seem not only to embrace the good works wrought by "those that love their fellow men," but to involve also a comparative study of the social and theologi-

cal ideas by which they were inspired and in the light of which they may be explained. This, at least, would be demanded from any complete study of the subject.

Mr. Kirkman Gray has, however, set himself a more limited task. He is rather concerned to find a reasoned answer to the question as to what should be the sphere of charity in the modern state. What tasks may it appropriately undertake? How should its functions be delimited as between itself and state action?

In seeking an answer to these questions, Mr. Gray thinks we must first interrogate the past in order to learn the lessons of experience. His book is therefore an attempt to recount the History of Philanthropy in such a way as to reveal the development of principles applicable to the present.

The inquiry covers the period from the reign of Elizabeth to the end of the Eighteenth Century.

Comparatively little study, however, is sufficient to show the difficulty of tracing the development of any consistent principles governing the practice of philanthropy or tending definitely to assign to voluntary charity its appropriate sphere. Philanthropy is for the most part spontaneous, individual, experimental. In generation after generation, it is true, institutions need reform and such abiding evils as poverty and disease take new shapes that call for cure or prevention. Meanwhile the standpoint and level of public opinion are shifting. Each age brings a new interpretation of social responsibility. It is chiefly the work of philanthropy to lead the way, to inspire, to educate.

But necessarily, just in the measure of its success, the reason for the existence of any given movement for reform passes away. A History of Philanthropy tends, therefore, to be the tale of a succession of disconnected movements, of skirmishes in the advance guard of a progressive civilization.

Still certain abiding needs remain, and in the efforts to satisfy them the joint workers with voluntary charity are private economic enterprise and organized state action. How the division of labor between these three forces shall be made in the best interests of the society is the problem set for solution. The answer to such a question involves a complete social philosophy. A reading of past charitable history is, however, helpful in an attempt at such a construction. It is abundantly shown, for example, that as time passes many of the risks and uncertainties of life are calculable by the actuary. Economic enterprise in the shape of insur-

ance companies undertakes whatever was at one time left to the charity brief. Again certain public utilities come to be recognized by all but extreme individualists as best provided by means of a payment by tax according to ability rather than for a price from business corporations or from philanthropic gifts. Roads and bridges are no longer kept up by private charitable bequests as was often the case under Elizabeth. It is doubtful whether our hospitals should not be similarly maintained.

But the most marked change in the political temper of our time is in respect of the attitude towards the exercise of sovereign power in the interest of social well being. Compulsion is seen to have its place as a means to secure a higher performance of social duty. The conception of crime as antisocial action is changing as regards the kind of deeds or omissions that it includes. The state now compels the slave to be free where once the act of manumission was left to the promptings of philanthropy.

But perhaps insistence needs most to be laid on the fact that these three lines of activity are each needed to supplement each other. Their respective spheres are separated by no rigid boundaries. Their limits are elastic. For many purposes they should compete in healthy rivalry, each accessory to the other. The state administration needs the revivifying influence of the reformer and the inspiration of voluntary philanthropy, as self-interest in economic enterprise needs to be controlled by the former and ethicized by both. Charity, on the other hand, is often in danger of mistaking the means for the end, of resting content with removing symptoms and not the cause of evil, and above all of forgetting that with process of time, individuals need the recognition of rights that are due rather than the multiplication of bounties bestowed.

All these things Mr. Gray's book suggests, although the arrangement of his material and the language in which his story is told are both capable of improvement. We hope it may some day be strengthened and revised in such a way as to mark more thoroughly the difference between unnecessary and trivial details and the larger matters that mark the growth of political and ethical principles.

C. J. Hamilton.

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